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Abstract 
This study examines the relation between the athletic experience of board directors and 
corporate outcomes. We predict that athletes’ attributes, such as physical fitness, mental 
resilience, leadership, and team-working skills, enhance their monitoring role. Using a large 
sample from 71 countries, we find that athletic experience is associated with better firm 
performance. The benefits are more pronounced when the experience is of team sports and 
confrontational sports, and for firms experiencing financial crisis. The results remain consistent 
when we instrument the athletic experience of directors with the number of Olympic medals 
won and Olympic sports participated in by the country in question at the previous Olympic 
Games.  
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1. Introduction 
The experience and traits of board directors have important implications for corporate 
governance, influencing directors’ ability to cope with pressure and challenges (Güner et al., 
2008; White et al., 2014; Masulis et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2015). The job of board directors 
is characterized by high work pressure, important issues, difficult decisions, and complex 
environments, making it physically demanding and mentally challenging. The existing 
literature identifies some important ingredients of effective boards, such as the independence, 
expertise, network and experience of the board directors. Despite the importance of non-
business-related experience in shaping individuals, its impact on board effectiveness remains 
under-researched.  
 In this study, we focus on the impact of the athletic experience of board directors on 
firm performance and outcome. Physical fitness brings various psychological benefits, 
including a reduction of anxiety, stress, and tension. The literature in psychology finds that 
athletes manifest distinct personality and psychological traits and possess strong skills in 
certain areas (e.g. stress management and leadership). The abilities and skills developed in their 
athletic life are transferable to their later life, and have important implications for their post-
athletic career and life (Allen and Laborde, 2014). In general, athletes are found to exhibit 
physical fitness, mental resilience, a strong ability to manage pressure, and good team-working 
skills. Since athletic experience is likely to be related to physical fitness, and 
personality/psychological traits and skills that are highly demanded by boards, testing whether 
board members with athletic experience yield positive outcomes in terms of firm performance 
is of interest.  
The limited literature on the effect of physical fitness and mental resilience is mainly 
based on CEOs. Limbach and Sonnenburg (2015) measure CEOs’ fitness by their marathon 
experience and show that it has a positive effect on firm performance. Regarding mental 
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resilience and personal traits related to life experience, Malmendier et al. (2011) and 
Benmelech and Frydman (2015) show that CEOs’ military experience in early life influences 
their corporate policies. Malmendier et al. (2011) suggest that CEOs with military experience 
pursue more aggressive corporate policies, while Benmelech and Frydman (2015) show that 
they pursue more conservative corporate policies. Bernile et al. (2016) expand early-life 
experience to include natural disasters and economic depressions, and report a significant non-
monotonic relation between the intensity of CEOs’ early-life exposure to fatal disasters and 
corporate risk-taking. Building upon these studies, we extend the scope from CEOs to board 
members.  
Those studies examine firms from the US only, which makes it difficult to determine 
an accurate counterfactual. Our study overcomes this limitation by conducting the empirical 
tests in a cross-country data setting. Specifically, using a large global panel of 94,496 firm-
year observations from 14,328 firms in 71 countries over the period from 1999 to 2015, we 
find significant positive associations between athletic experience and both the return on assets 
(ROA) and Tobin’s Q of firms. The results suggest that the athletic experience of board 
directors benefits board governance and adds value to firms. 
The common challenge in interpreting such results is the endogenous matching between 
firms and directors. For example, alternative interpretations include firms with better 
performance potentially appointing directors with athletic experience for some reasons, or such 
directors being more likely to join firms with better performance. To address the potential 
endogeneity issue, we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) and two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) approaches. In the 2SLS, we use Olympic medals and Olympic sports as two 
instruments for Athlete and Athlete ratio, our main variables capturing the presence of directors 
with athletic experience. We expect that a firm is more likely to have these “athlete directors” 
in countries that perform better and participate in more types of sport in the Olympic Games. 
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The results from the PSM and 2SLS approaches further confirm the benefits of athletic 
experience for firm performance.  
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we add to the literature on 
effective boards (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Jiang and Murphy, 2007; Güner et al., 2008; 
White et al., 2014; Litov et al., 2014; Francis et al., 2015) by providing evidence on an 
important new determinant, namely athletic experience, based on an international sample of 71 
countries. We show that it is not only backgrounds providing professional expertise (e.g. 
financial, legal, and former-CEO experience) but also non-professional backgrounds (e.g. 
athletic experience) that can have significant explanatory power for board performance and 
firm value. 
Second, we add to the growing literature on the governance implications of the personal 
experiences on firm outcome. Prior studies primarily focused on CEOs’ experience of natural 
disasters, economic depression and the military (Malmendier et al., 2011; Benmelech and 
Frydman, 2015; Bernile et al., 2016) as well as sports-related hobbies such as marathon 
(Limbach and Sonnenburg, 2015) and golf (Biggerstaff et al., 2017). We complement these 
studies by extending the scope to board directors. We show that non-business-related 
experience could be important to shape board directors.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the data and sample. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and discusses the endogeneity issues. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Related literature and hypothesis development  
2.1 Personal traits, abilities and skills of athletes 
The psychology literature identifies personality and psychological traits of athletes or 
those with athletic experience. Some studies (Mihailescu and Cucui, 2014; Gould et al., 2002; 
Allen et al., 2011) suggest athletes tend to be more emotionally stable and confident than others. 
Hedgpeth and Sowa (1998) show that athletes have a high level of resilience as they regularly 
receive formal training on management techniques that help them cope with stress and difficult 
situations such as injuries during their sporting career. Allen and Laborde (2014) suggest that 
personality traits predict participation in physical activity and the success of athletes.  
Researchers also suggest that athletic experiences have important implications for 
personal development later in the lives of athletes. For example, Allen and Laborde (2014) 
provide evidence that the personality traits of athletes are associated with mobility and strength 
in old age, and experience of participating in sports contributes to the development of 
personality over a lifetime. Gould et al. (2002) suggest that family, coach, community, and 
sports environment play important roles in the psychological development of athletes, both 
directly (i.e. through teaching or training) and indirectly (i.e. through psychological and social 
environments). Besides the aforementioned personality traits, researchers have examined 
which transferable abilities and skills are developed throughout the athletic life. Some studies 
show evidence that athletes possess stronger leadership skills and perform better in a group 
environment than non-athletes. Using 13 varsity teams, Loughead et al. (2006) find evidence 
that athletes show strong leadership in team tasks, and they have very good skills in managing 
external relationships. In a comprehensive review of personality in sport, Allen et al. (2013) 
highlight the role of personality for team effectiveness and group processes in team sports. The 
personality traits of athletes could be related to the development of interpersonal relationships 
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in other social contexts. Specifically, such personality traits are associated with relationship 
management, commitment, and conflict reconciliation. These strong interpersonal skills result 
from the relationship commitment in coach-athlete dyads or athlete-athlete dyads in team sports 
(Jackson et al., 2010, 2011). In addition, sports participation could facilitate the development 
of maturity concepts including discipline, teamwork, organization, fair play, and tough-
mindness (Allen et al., 2013). 
In addition to the mental strength reflected in these personality traits, and the abilities 
and skills developed in the athletic life, physical fitness is undoubtedly a distinguishable 
physical feature of those who have an athletic background, and could benefit post-athletic 
career and life (Allen and Laborde, 2014). Physical fitness could affect study or work 
performance (Rhea et al., 2004) through two main channels: cognitive functions and stress 
management. First, a number of neuroscientific and psychological studies have been carried 
out on the impact of fitness on cognitive abilities and academic or work performance. Using a 
sample of 214 sixth-grade students in the United States, Coe (2006) shows that students who 
participated in vigorous activity achieved better academic performance than those who did not. 
Kramer et al. (1999) and Colcombe and Kramer (2003) report evidence that aerobic fitness 
improves neurocognitive functions and therefore benefits the executive control process in 
several ways (e.g. scheduling, planning and working memory). Second, prior studies suggest 
that physical fitness could play a buffering role for those facing stressful life events (e.g. Brown, 
1991). For example, Newcombe and Boyle (1995) find that sports participants are more 
vigorous, and less confused and anxious. Folkins and Sime (1981) show that physical training 
improves self-concept, mood, and work performance, but they stress that physical fitness per 
se does not affect most personality traits. 
Two studies directly examine the effect of physical fitness in the business setting. Using 
interview data on top executives in firms, Neck et al. (2000) report that fitness benefits such as 
7 
strong cognitive functions, the ability to cope with pressure, and stamina significantly 
contribute to the strong leadership of executives. Limbach and Sonnenburg (2015) use CEOs’ 
completion of a marathon as a proxy for their fitness. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs 
during the period 2001-2011, they find strong evidence that the physical fitness of the CEO has 
a positive impact on firm value, consistent with the beneficial effects of fitness on cognitive 
abilities, stress management, and job performance. They also report that CEO fitness is 
associated with higher firm profitability and higher announcement returns in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
2.2 Personal characteristics, personal experience, and firm performance 
Several recent studies examine the correlation between personal physical features (e.g. 
facial features) and firms’ decisions and performance. For example, Cook and Mobbs (2016) 
suggest that CEOs with attractive faces could improve firm performance through increasing 
sales in certain industries. Halford and Hsu (2014) find that facial attractiveness is associated 
with higher announcement returns in mergers and acquisitions and around CEO appointments. 
Graham et al. (2016) show that CEOs with attractive faces receive higher compensation. This 
recent literature that highlights the explanatory power of physical attractiveness for firm 
performance could be relevant to our study. Some sports management studies show that 
athletes are seen as more attractive (Boyd and Shank, 2004) and that using athletes as endorsers 
can increase sales and firm performance (Fink et al., 2004). Although in our study we 
concentrate on the personal traits, ability and skills of athletes, we cannot rule out the possibility 
of a potential endorsement effect associated with physical attractiveness, through which 
athletes affect firm performance. However, this may not be a major concern, considering that 
our research focus is athlete directors and not athlete (product) endorsers. It is unlikely that 
firms appoint athlete directors solely based on their facial attractiveness, although that could 
be the case in the selection of product endorsers. 
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Another strand of literature focuses on the impact of the personal experience of 
executives on managerial decisions, financial policies, and corporate outcomes. Malmendier et 
al. (2011) suggest that early-life experience is an important factor in explaining corporate 
financing decisions. They find that CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression are 
reluctant to issue debt and rely excessively on internal finance. They also report evidence that 
CEOs with military service experience tend to adopt aggressive corporate policies. In contrast 
to Malmendier et al. (2011), Benmelech and Frydman (2015) detect a significant association 
between military service experience and conservative corporate policies. They find that 
military CEOs tend to invest less, are less likely to be involved in corporate fraud, and 
outperform others during industry downturns. Both studies explicitly show that military service 
experience has a significant impact on managerial decisions and firm performance, albeit the 
results are not consistent. Bernile et al. (2016) expand the study of CEOs’ early-life experience 
by focusing on early-life disasters (e.g. natural disasters). They report a significant correlation 
between CEOs’ early-life exposure to fatal disasters and their risk-taking when it comes to 
corporate decisions including those concerning cash holdings, leverage, and mergers and 
acquisitions. Specifically, they find that CEOs tend to be more aggressive in corporate policies 
if the disasters they experienced did not have extremely negative consequences, and more 
conservative in corporate policies if the disasters they experienced had extreme downsides. 
These studies demonstrate that the impact of CEOs’ early-life experiences on corporate policies 
and firm performance is economically significant.  
In a similar vein, we argue that athletic experience could also play a role in explaining 
corporate outcomes. For those former athletes who retired a long time ago, their athletic 
experience can now be considered an early-life experience. Even those who have retired 
relatively recently or are still active in sports will usually have begun training early in life 
(Baxter-Jones and Helms, 1996; Myer et al., 2013). This is particularly the case for most 
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successful athletes. Thus, they will have had early-life athletic training and competition 
experience. Such early-life athletic activities play a crucial role in the development of the 
psychological traits and personalities of athletes (Hedgpeth and Sowa, 1998; Gould et al., 2002), 
and have a significant influence on later life (Allen and Laborde, 2014). Receiving training 
from an early age can also help the development of leadership and interpersonal skills 
(Loughead et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2010, 2011). Furthermore, although some studies show 
that family influence (e.g. support, pressure, and parents’ sporting experience) is important 
(Leff and Hoyle, 1995; Gould et al., 2002) in the personal development of athletes, the evidence 
on the correlation between family wealth and the successfulness of athletes (or age when 
starting training) is very limited. 
2.3 Effectiveness of corporate boards 
Corporate boards have two main functions: advisory and monitoring (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). The types of board structures and characteristics of board directors that best fit 
these two functions are important but unresolved questions. To establish the link between 
personal experience (e.g. athletic experience) and firm performance, it is pertinent to 
understand the factors related to effective corporate governance. Existing literature reveals that 
the effectiveness of boards is associated with certain board characteristics, such as 
independence, size, meeting attendance, equal involvement of board directors, 
knowledge/skills of board directors, and board directors’ gender and age. In this section, we 
discuss the literature on several important topics that are highly relevant to our study in the 
domain of corporate governance: independence, commitment, leadership, and professional 
experience. 
Independence 
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An enormous amount of attention has been focused on the effect of board independence 
on the effectiveness of corporate boards. Theoretically, the dominant function of independent 
board directors is monitoring, in which case these directors would, ideally, not be controlled or 
influenced by executives or other directors. An independent and effective board should 
alleviate the agency problem by supervising and disciplining management, which can enhance 
corporate decision-making and firm performance. Most empirical studies propose a positive 
relation between board independence and performance (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992; Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Dahya et al., 2008; Devos et al., 2009; Nguyen 
and Nielsen, 2010; Fauver et al., 2017). The literature identifies two important channels 
through which board independence affects firm value. First, independent directors could 
increase firm value by removing poor management (Weisbach, 1988; Bebchuk and Cohen, 
2005). Second, boards structured to be more independent are more effective at monitoring the 
corporate financial accounting process, and board independence seems to be related to a lower 
cost of capital (Klein, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004). However, it should be noted that the vast 
majority of studies have emphasized structure-related independence (i.e. board structures that 
feature high independence). We focus more on personal traits-related independence (e.g. 
athlete directors’ independent thinking and willingness to challenge) and aim to explore how 
it affects board effectiveness and firm performance.  
Commitment 
The commitment of the directors is an important factor in effective corporate 
governance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) document evidence that the quality of corporate 
governance is poor in firms with “busy boards” (i.e. where a majority of outside directors hold 
at least three directorships). These firms usually exhibit lower sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to performance, lower profitability, and higher book-to-market ratios. The market 
reaction (i.e. abnormal returns) to departures of busy outside directors is significantly positive. 
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The acquisition of an additional directorship by a director leads to negative abnormal returns 
for the other firms in which they hold directorships. These findings suggest that directors’ 
commitment could significantly affect board performance. 
Leadership 
Kiel and Nicholson (2005) assert that leadership is among the most important elements 
of effective corporate governance. They argue that boards have become “increasingly more 
proactive in the leadership of the firms they govern”, representing “a paradigm shift in 
management thinking” as the role of boards has gradually moved from managerial support to 
business leadership. Effective leadership could help firms establish their values and culture, 
identify strategic direction, formulate and achieve corporate objectives, and facilitate strategy 
implementation. Therefore, directors’ leadership is crucial for a board to function effectively. 
Professional experience 
Prior studies show that the personal background or professional expertise (e.g. 
academic and legal) of the board directors could affect firm performance. For example, Güner 
et al. (2008) analyse how directors with financial expertise affect corporate decisions. They 
find that shareholders benefit from financial expertise on boards, as investment-cashflow 
sensitivity decreases and external funding increases when commercial bankers join boards. 
Francis et al. (2015) report that firms perform better when they have directors with an academic 
background. Their results show the presence of academic directors on boards to be correlated 
with greater stock price informativeness, lower CEO compensation, higher sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to performance, and lower discretionary accruals. They argue that academic 
directors play an effective governance role through their advising and monitoring functions. 
Jiang and Murphy (2007) and White et al. (2014) also demonstrate that the market values the 
appointment of professors for their expertise. Besides the academic background of directors, 
researchers have shown great interest in investigating how directors’ legal and political 
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background affects the board’s effectiveness. For example, Litov et al. (2014) find that lawyer-
directors could play an important advisory role in managing litigation and regulation, and 
structuring compensation, so as to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001) show that outside directors with a political background could improve the 
effectiveness of boards in firms for which politics matters more. These findings are consistent 
with the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003), which suggests that human 
capital, possessed via various channels (e.g. expertise, knowledge, reputation, and health), is 
an important source of competitive advantage. 
2.4 Hypothesis 
The review of the literature shows a significant overlap between the characteristics of 
athletes and the factors related to effective corporate boards. Athletic experience could affect 
the performance of corporate boards for several reasons. First, physical fitness likely plays an 
important role for board directors, as they face increasingly high demands and level of 
responsibility (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). Compared with other people, those with athletic 
experience have a unique advantage in this aspect. Physical fitness could help with cognitive 
functions and stress management, and positively affects work performance (Rhea et al., 2004; 
Allen and Laborde, 2014).  
Second, the vast literature on corporate governance shows that board independence has 
a significant positive impact on firm performance (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992; Devos et al., 2009; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Fauver et al., 2017). Besides 
structural independence (i.e. the composition of the board and the relation between the board 
directors and CEO), we argue that independence stemming from the personality traits of the 
directors could also play an important role. Prior psychology and sport literature shows that 
athletes manifest certain attributes associated with personal independence, and could help 
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enhance board independence. For example, Mihailescu and Cucui (2014) find that athletes have 
high levels of emotional stability, self-control, concentration of attention, and self-orientation. 
Some other studies have focused on high-level athletes (i.e. those who compete in national or 
international tournaments). Allen et al. (2011) report that high-level athletes are more 
emotionally stable, more confident, and more independent, based on a survey of 253 athletes. 
Using a sample of Olympic champions, Gould et al. (2002) provide evidence that the main 
characteristics of these athletes include toughness of mind, a high level of self-confidence, self-
orientation, and a high ability to ignore distractions from others. They are willing to challenge 
themselves and others, and their personality traits are associated with a high level of 
independence. Therefore, we expect that board directors with athletic experience are more 
likely to speak out and challenge senior executives (e.g. CEOs). The attributes of athletes may 
make them good independent directors. 
Third, board resilience is important for corporate governance, especially in market 
downturns or during crisis periods (Johnson et al. 2000; Mitton, 2002; Francis et al., 2012). 
Empirical evidence shows that high levels of resilience and perseverance are among the most 
important psychological characteristics of athletes, as they regularly receive formal training on 
management techniques, helping them to cope with stress and difficult situations such as 
injuries during their sporting career (Hedgpeth and Sowa, 1998; Gould et al., 2002). Thus, 
directors with athletic experience could bring their mental resilience into the boardroom and 
enhance firm value. 
Fourth, board directors’ degree of commitment in terms of time and effort expended in 
exercising their duties significantly affects board performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Prior studies show that less committed boards are associated with weak corporate governance, 
and that the performance of firms featuring such boards is poorer than that of those with more 
committed boards. Psychological studies show that athletes have a hard-work ethic, a strong 
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belief in effort, a high level of commitment, and a strong feeling of responsibility (Gould et al., 
2002). Therefore, board directors with athletic experience are likely to exercise their duties in 
a more active, responsible, and committed manner.  
Finally, the leadership role of boards is becoming more important than ever before for 
firm management (Kiel and Nicholson, 2005). The literature on sports psychology suggests 
that athletes, on average, show very strong leadership in group processes (Loughead et al., 
2006). In addition, they perform well in relationship management and conflict reconciliation. 
This is particularly the case for those who have played team sports. For example, the 
relationship commitment in coach-athlete dyads or athlete-athlete dyads helps them to develop 
strong interpersonal skills (Jackson et al., 2010, 2011). Thus, board members with athletic 
experience could have an advantage in the dynamic group environment of corporate boards, 
and help boards to fulfil their leadership role. 
Overall, based on the above dicussion, we predict that board directors with athletic 
experience play an active and positive role in the governance process and help their firms to 
increase their value and performance, given their personal characteristics and abilities. We 
hereby hypothesise the following:  
H1: Athlete directors are positively related to firm value and performance.  
3. Data 
3.1 Data and sample 
Our data come from two sources. We obtain information on board directors around the 
world from the BoardEx database. More specifically, the data cover the ratio of athlete directors 
and other board-level characteristics including board size, the ratio of non-executive directors, 
the ratio of nationality diversification, and the ratio of male directors. We obtain firm 
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performance measures, including Tobin’s Q and the ROA, and other firm-level characteristics, 
from Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope. Country-level variables (i.e. rule of law and corruption) 
are collected from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). After cleaning up 
observations with any missing values for the variables used in our main analysis, we obtain a 
sample with 94,496 firm-year observations for 14,328 firms in 71 countries from 1999 to 2015. 
We are aware that the potential survivorship bias could distort the results. That is, we are more 
likely to observe the outperforming firms than the underperforming (i.e. failed firms). To 
minimize this concern, we exhaust the databases and ensure that our sample covers all 
observations available, including both active and inactive (i.e. failed) firms. However, we still 
need to be cautious when interpreting the results, considering that the databases are likely to 
cover more active than failed firms. 
In this study, we identify the athlete directors by reviewing the achievements profiles 
of board directors. An athlete director is defined as one who was a professional or collegiate 
athlete and obtained achievements or prizes in any sports competition. For the sports 
competitions, we obtained lists of summer and winter Olympic sports 
(www.olympic.org/sports) and world sports championships 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_world_sports_championships), and classify a director 
as an athlete director if his/her achievements are related to a sports event included in these lists. 
In order to prevent bias in identifying athlete directors, we also classify a director as an athlete 
director if his/her achievements listed in the achievements profile include the words “Olympic”, 
“World Championships”, “sportsman”, or “athlete”. The final athlete director-year sample 
includes 2,965 observations. Although we have tried our best to identify the athlete directors, 
there might still be some undetectable athlete directors who took part in sports not included in 
the Olympics or the Wikipedia list of world sports championships. In this case, our inferences 
could underestimate the true effects of athlete directors. 
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3.2 Measures of athlete directors and firm performance 
To measure the presence of athlete directors, we create a dummy, Athlete, equal to one 
if a firm has at least one athlete director on its board, and zero otherwise. In addition, to capture 
the relative presence of athlete directors, we use Athlete ratio, defined as the number of athlete 
directors over the total number of directors. Following previous corporate board studies (e.g. 
Devos et al., 2009; Francis et al., 2015), we employ a market-based measure, Tobin’s Q, as our 
main proxy for firm performance. It is defined as the market value of assets (calculated as the 
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity) over the 
book value of assets. As a robustness check, we also use ROA, as an accounting measure of 
operating performance. ROA is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. It should be 
noted that there is a potential endogeneity problem, mainly resulting from reverse causality and 
omitted variables in our regressions. To address this concern, we employ the PSM and 2SLS 
approaches in additional analyses. Those methods and the results of those tests are discussed 
in detail in Section 4.3. 
3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 Panel A provides the summary statistics for the full sample, and for subsamples 
with and without athlete directors. Sections A, B, and C show that the firm-year observations 
of boards with athlete directors (2,956 observations) account for about 3% of the total of 94,496 
firm-year observations. The maximum ratio of athlete directors is 43%. Section D presents the 
differences in means. It shows that all the firm and board characteristics are significantly 
different between firms with and without athlete directors. For example, the ROA for firms 
with athlete directors is 3.53% higher than the ROA for those without athlete directors. Panel 
B presents the distribution by country. We also present the distribution of the relative presence 
of athlete directors by industry in Panel C. It shows that Amusement and Recreation Services 
has the highest percentage of athlete observations (14.14%), followed by Railroad 
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Transportation (10.56%) and then Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 
(10.39%). There is no direct link between any of these three industries and sports. It seems that 
the presence of athlete directors is not correlated with specific industries (e.g. athletic 
equipment or other sport-related sectors). The distribution may suggest that athlete directors 
are likely to play more of a monitoring role than an advisory role (e.g. providing sporting 
expertise) on boards. Finally, we graph the percentage of firms with athlete directors around 
the world in Figure 1. It shows that North America, Russia, and Australia have high percentages, 
while Africa and Asia have low percentages. This may cause a selection bias concern, in that 
athletes in Africa and Asia might be less likely to receive formal education and, therefore, be 
qualified to act as board directors, compared to those in North America, Russia, and Australia. 
To alleviate this potential problem, we control for the educational level of the athlete directors 
and country fixed effects in our regressions. In addition, unreported results show there is no 
significant correlation between the average level of education of athlete directors and the 
country. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Athlete directors and firm value  
In this section, we examine the impact of athletic backgrounds within the board of 
directors on firm value using our large global dataset. As previously discussed, we use Tobin’s 
Q as the main measure of firm performance. The key independent variables Athlete and Athlete 
ratio capture the presence and relative presence (proportion) of athlete directors siting on the 
board. Following previous studies, we control for some board and firm characteristics that may 
18 
affect firm value (e.g. Devos et al., 2009; Francis et al., 2015). Other board-related variables 
include Board size, Independence, Male, and Foreign. The firm-level controls include Firm 
size, Sales growth, Leverage and Cashflow. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Table 2 
reports the results from regressions of Tobin’s Q on the two athlete director variables using 
different specifications. All regressions include year, country, and two-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects.1  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the relation between athlete directors and firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q, estimated using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with robust 
standard errors. In Column 1 (specification 1), we include our key independent variable - the 
Athlete dummy - and firm-level controls. In specification (2) we further include other types of 
experience (academic, financial, and legal) and five board variables which may also affect firm 
value. Institutional environment could affect corporate governance and the performance of 
firms. Therefore, in order to capture differences in it across countries, in specification (3) we 
include two country-level variables, Rule of law and Corruption. These two variables measure 
a country’s legal environment and corruption level, respectively2. In Column 4, we rerun the 
regression from specification (3) and further add the lag of Tobin’s Q as a control variable. In 
order to further examine the association between the relative presence of athlete directors and 
firm value, we rerun specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) and use Athlete ratio instead of the 
Athlete dummy, in specifications (5), (6), (7), and (8) respectively. Across all the columns of 
Table 2, the estimated coefficients on our athlete director variables are positive and statistically 
                                                 
1 In our regression analysis we further control for three-digit SIC code and four-digit SIC code as a robustness 
check, and the results are consistent with those obtained when controlling for two-digit SIC codes. 
2 See La Porta et al. (1998) for more details on the definitions of the variables and further explanation.    
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significant at least to the 5% level, consistently supporting our hypothesis that the athletic 
experience of these directors increases firm value. Specifically, in Column 2 we find that the 
coefficient on the Athlete dummy is significantly positive at the 1% level. The effect of athlete 
directors is also economically significant: Tobin’s Q is approximately 0.06 units higher for 
firms with athlete directors than for firm without athlete directors. Moreover, in Column 6 we 
find that the coefficient on Athlete ratio is also significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating 
that a unit increase in the proportion of athlete directors on the board is associated with an 
increase in the firm’s Tobin’s Q of about 0.56 units. 
We also find that the coefficient on Academic is significantly positive at the 1% level 
across all specifications. This result is consistent with Jiang and Murphy (2007) and White et 
al. (2014), who suggest that the appointment of academics for their expertise adds value to a 
firm. The coefficient on Legal expertise is significantly negative at the 5% level across all 
specifications, contradictory to Litov et al. (2014). It should be noted that, even after controlling 
for these experiences, the coefficient on our athlete variable (i.e. Athlete or Athlete ratio) is still 
significantly positive at the same level. In addition, the unreported correlation matrix shows 
that there is no significant correlation between Athlete (or Athlete ratio) and these other types 
of experience (i.e. academic, financial, and legal). The correlation result suggests that, if athlete 
directors increase firm value, they likely do so mainly through playing a more effective 
monitoring role, and not through playing a more effective advisory role. An effective advisory 
role requires business-related expertise or experience, but athlete directors do not seem to have 
them, as indicated by the very low and insignificant correlation. This echoes what we observed 
in the distribution of the presence of athlete directors by industry in Table 1 Panel C.3 Turning 
to the board-level control variables, we find a significant positive correlation between 
                                                 
3 The distribution in Table 1 Panel C shows the representativeness of athlete directors to be seemingly uncorrelated 
with specific industries, while an advisory role is likely to require expertise or experience in a particular industry. 
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Education and firm value, showing that the average educational level of the directors has a 
positive impact on firm value. This result is consistent with some previous studies (e.g. 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Hillman et al., 2002) that have suggested that education could 
enhance the cognitive/productive capabilities of directors and hence benefit firms. We also 
report a significant positive coefficient on Board size and Foreign. However, the proportion of 
male directors on the board has a significantly negative impact on firm value. In addition, with 
regard to the firm-level control variables, we find firm size to have a negative effect on Tobin’s 
Q, while the sales growth rate and leverage have positive effects. These results are generally in 
line with the literature (e.g. Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Francis et al., 2015; Limbach and 
Sonnenburg, 2015). 
In addition, according to the summary statistics, the US accounts for around 50% of all 
observations, raising the concern that our results may be driven by the US part of the sample. 
We therefore split our sample into US and non-US subsamples and replicate the tests. In both 
subsamples, these tests indicate that our results are not driven by the US sample. Furthermore, 
considering that several countries adopt the two-tier board system, we conduct split-sample 
tests by dropping those countries (Austria, China, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). The unreported results are consistent with the 
baseline results in Table 2.4 
In sum, the results reported in Table 2 indicate that the previous athletic experience of 
directors has a positive impact on firm performance and suggest that the personal attributes (i.e. 
physical fitness and personality/psychological traits) of athletes could contribute to the 
effectiveness of boards and enhance firm value. Our findings complement the literature on the 
                                                 
4 In our baseline regression in Table 2, for the countries that adopt the two-tier board system, the athlete ratio is 
defined as the proportion of athlete directors on the management board, consistent with the definition for the 
countries that adopt the single-tier board system. 
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effect of expertise-related personal experiences on board performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001; Jiang and Murphy, 2007; Güner et al., 2008; White et al., 2014; Litov et al., 2014; Francis 
et al., 2015) and show that such non-expertise-related personal experience as athletic 
experience also has real economic consequences for corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
4.2 Athlete directors’ performance during a time of distress 
As discussed earlier, one of the reasons that might explain why athlete directors perform 
better is that they may cope better in difficult situations and under pressure. To assess whether 
athlete directors handle difficulties and pressure better, we examine whether there are 
differential effects on firm performance during periods of distress. The 2007-08 financial crisis 
affected many countries simultaneously (especially OECD countries) and led to a global 
economic crisis on a scale not seen since the Great Depression. It thus represents an exogenous 
and systematic shock that applied to most firms. The salience of the financial crisis thus 
provides a natural experiment we can use to study whether athlete directors may play a more 
positive role in bad times.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In order to conduct our analysis, we construct a subsample which includes all firms 
from the OECD countries over the period of 2004-2009. We believe that most firms from 
OECD countries are likely to have experienced difficulty or distress during the recent financial 
crisis period (2007-2009). We refine the analysis by interacting the athlete variables with a 
dummy variable capturing this period. Table 3 reports the results from regressions in which the 
dependent variables are Tobin’s Q (Columns 1 and 3) and the stock return (Columns 2 and 4), 
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respectively. As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on the athlete director variables (i.e. Athlete 
and Athlete ratio) are significantly positive for Tobin’s Q and negative for the stock return at 
the 1% level, suggesting that firms with athlete directors are associated with higher Tobin’s Q 
but lower stock returns than firms without athlete directors before the financial crisis. The 
coefficient on Crisis is significantly negative for Tobin’s Q, indicating a significant decrease 
in firm value during the financial crisis for firms without athlete directors. The coefficients on 
the interaction terms between Athlete (ratio) and Crisis capture the incremental effect of athlete 
directors on firm performance during bad times. The coefficients on the interaction terms are 
significantly positive in all specifications, indicating that athlete directors increased firm 
performance more significantly during the financial crisis period (i.e. a bad time). The findings 
support our expectation that athlete directors handle crises and pressure better and can thereby 
enhance firm performance. 
4.3 Endogeneity issues 
Our regression results in the previous sections show a significant correlation between 
the presence of athlete directors and firm value or performance. One possible explanation is 
that athletes in boardrooms could help firms to increase their value and improve their 
performance. However, we should be cautious about this interpretation, as there might be an 
endogeneity problem. First, reverse causality could be an issue since athletes might be more 
likely to join better-performing firms for various reasons. For example, they might choose firms 
with good performance to preserve their reputations, or it could be the case that better-
performing firms have more financial resources (e.g. more competitive compensation packages) 
to attract athletes. Second, omitted variables might distort our results, considering that there 
are many other factors which could affect firm value or performance. To address these 
endogeneity concerns, we use two approaches to conduct additional analyses in this section. 
Specifically, we employ the PSM method to alleviate selection bias related to the observable 
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firm and board member characteristics. We also apply an instrumental variable approach (2SLS) 
to mitigate the potential reverse causality and omitted variable problems. In the remainder of 
this section, we introduce these two methods and discuss the results. 
First, following Abadie and Imbens (2016), we apply a nearest-neighbour matching 
estimator based on a propensity score to construct a matching sample using firms without 
athlete directors. This approach ensures that each observation in the testing sample (firms with 
athlete directors) is paired with an observation in the matching sample (firms without athlete 
directors). Our propensity score model includes firm size, leverage, cashflow over net sales, 
sales growth, academic experience, financial expertise, legal expertise, board size, non-
executive director ratio, male director ratio, foreign director ratio, average educational level, 
rule of law, corruption index, country, year, and industry. We rerun the regressions using a 
sample which pools the testing sample and the matching sample. The final sample includes 
5,930 observations.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the association between athlete directors and 
firm performance using a sample that pools the testing sample and the matching sample. 
Consistent with our results from Section 4.1, the results provide empirical support for our 
expectation that athlete directors have a positive impact on firm performance. More specifically, 
we find that the coefficients on Athlete for both Tobin’s Q and ROA are positive and significant 
at least at the 5% level, indicating that, when compared to the matched firms, the presence of 
athlete directors is associated with higher firm value and profitability. Similarly, we find that 
the coefficients on Athlete ratio for both Tobin’s Q and ROA are positive and significant to at 
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least 10%, indicating that the more athlete directors there are on the board, the higher are firm 
value and profitability.  
Second, we provide two instruments for Athlete and Athlete ratio, capturing level of 
achievement at and participation in the Olympic Games, by each country. The instruments are 
motivated by the intuition that people with athletic experience are more likely to be selected as 
directors in countries that have performed better and participated in more sports in the Olympic 
Games. These two factors could indicate the development and importance of sports in that 
country. We expect that countries with well-developed sports sectors, and with a strong 
emphasis on sports, are likely to have more athlete directors for two reasons. First, the 
proportion of athletes within the population of these countries tends to be higher. Second, the 
society and firms are likely to pay higher respect to athletes and value athletic experience more 
when recruiting or nominating board directors. We therefore use Olympic medals and Olympic 
sports as two instrumental variables in our study. Olympic medals is defined as the total number 
of medals (gold, silver, and bronze) the country won in the Summer and Winter Olympic 
Games, scaled by 100. Olympic sports is defined as the total number of sports in which a 
country participated, in the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, scaled by 100. To construct 
these variables, we hand-collect the total number of medals won by each country in each year 
from the website of the International Olympic Committee (https://www.olympic.org) and the 
combined total number of summer and winter sports each country has participated in over all 
Olympic Games from Wikipedia.  
In our first-stage regression, we run a probit model in which the dependent variable is 
Athlete, and the independent variables include Olympic medals, Olympic sports, Academic, 
Financial expertise, Legal expertise, Education, Board size, Independence, Male, Foreign, Firm 
size, Sales growth, Leverage, Cashflow, Law, Corruption, and industry, year and country fixed 
effects. Our results are reported in Panel A of Table 5. The coefficients on Olympic medals and 
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Olympic sports are 0.017 (sig. at 1% level) and 0.077 (sig. at 1% level), respectively, suggesting 
that the likelihood of having at least one athlete director on the board of a firm is positively 
associated with the performance of the country at the Olympic Games and the number of 
Olympic sports in which the country has participated. We also run a separate regression to 
examine the relation between Athlete ratio and the two instrumental variables. We report highly 
significant coefficients on both Olympic medals (coeff.= 0.002, sig. at 1% level) and Olympic 
sports (coeff.=0.009, sig. at 1% level). 
We report our second-stage regression results in Panel B of Table 5. In the second-stage 
regression, we regress firm performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q) on Athlete (predicted 
probability that a firm has at least one athlete director from the first-stage regression) and 
Athlete ratio (predicted ratio of athlete directors to board size from the first-stage regression). 
As shown in Column 1, the coefficient on Athlete is 2.038 and significant at 5%. Column 2 
shows that the coefficient on Athlete ratio is 15.391 and significant at 5%. One potential 
problem with our two instrumental variables is that Olympic medals and sports may affect firm 
performance through channels other than athlete directors. To confirm the validity of our 
instruments and the 2SLS method, we run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the result rejects the 
null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level. 5  Overall, the results from the 2SLS 
regression are consistent with our baseline regressions and the PSM results, suggesting that our 
earlier findings are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
                                                 
5 We also run tests for overidentifying restrictions. Both Sargan and Basmann test statistics suggest that our 
instrumental variables are valid. 
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4.4 Types of athletic experience and background of athlete directors 
The results thus far show that athlete directors are positively associated with firm 
performance. This section presents various additional tests on whether different types of 
athletic experience or different characteristics of athletic directors impact firm performance 
differently, based on the sample firms with athlete directors. Board directors’ teamwork, 
communication, and interpersonal skills significantly impact board effectiveness. As team-
sport athletes compete and train in a team environment, they learn how to be good leaders and 
followers, how to receive and provide advice for the betterment of the team, and how to take 
control of a situation. They understand roles and know where they fit in. Therefore, we expect 
the team-sport athlete directors to enhance board effectiveness and firm performance more 
significantly than the non-team-sport athlete directors. As we discussed earlier, one of the 
reasons why athlete directors may improve corporate governance may be that they are more 
effective monitors. This may be especially true if they have been involved in confrontational 
sports, because they may be more likely to challenge and actively monitor the management 
team than directors who have participated in non-confrontational sports. In addition, athlete 
directors’ past achievements and reputation in sports could influence the roles they play in the 
boardroom and their contributions to firms. Top sportspeople tend to be natural leaders and 
receive more respect from other directors and management. Therefore, athlete directors with 
and without high levels of achievement and strong reputations may have different impacts on 
board effectiveness and subsequent firm performance. We also empirically investigate whether 
the presence of executive athlete directors affects corporate governance and firm performance 
differently to the presence of non-executive athlete directors. Finally, we examine the potential 
impact of the educational level of athlete directors on firm value. 
To this end, we employ the PSM model to run regressions parallel to those in Table 4, 
but replacing the dummy variables Athlete with five different variables: (1) Team-sport, which 
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indicates the relative presence (i.e. proportion) of team-sport athlete directors on the board; (2) 
Confrontational sport, which captures the relative presence of athlete directors who were 
involved in confrontational sports on the board; (3) Achievement, which indicates the athlete 
directors’ sporting achievements and reputations; (4) Executive athlete, which indicates the 
relative presence of executive athlete directors on the board as a proportion of all athlete 
directors on the board; (5) Athlete_education, which indicates the average educational level of 
athlete directors. The estimation results are reported in Table 6. In an additional untabulated 
robustness check, we estimate regressions using ROA as the measure of firm performance 
instead of Tobin’s Q. We again obtain similar results to our reported findings.6  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Column 1, we find the coefficient on Team-sport to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that team-sport athlete directors have a more significant 
impact on firm value than individual-sport athlete directors. Similarly, in Column 2, the 
coefficient on Confrontational sport is positive and statistically significant at 1%, suggesting 
that athlete directors who were involved in confrontational sports have a stronger impact on 
firm value than those involved in non-confrontational sports. These results confirm our 
expectation that the type of sport in which an athlete director participated does matter in 
explaining their effect on firm value. In Column 3, the coefficient on Achievement is not 
statistically significant. This result indicates that athlete directors with high levels of 
achievement and good reputations in sport have similar impacts on firm value to those without 
such positive qualities. Column 4 shows that the coefficient on the ratio of executive athlete 
                                                 
6 All these untabulated results are available on request from the authors. 
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directors to total athlete directors is not statistically significant, suggesting that an athlete 
director being an executive versus a non-executive director is not an important factor in 
explaining their effect on firm value. It could be argued that athletes are expected to play a 
larger role as non-executive directors than executive directors, since they would be particularly 
independent and this is more important in a non-executive role. Contradictory to this 
expectation, we do not find any significant difference between the executive and non-executive 
groups. However, our finding may suggest that, instead of independence, it is physical fitness 
and mental resilience (Malmendier et al., 2011; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Limbach and 
Sonnenburg, 2015) that enables athletes to play a more important role on boards and add value 
to firms. This is also consistent with our finding that athlete directors increase firm performance 
more significantly during crisis periods. Finally, there might be a concern that athletes in some 
countries may be less likely to receive formal education, and would therefore not be qualified 
to act as board directors. This selection issue might distort our results. To address this concern, 
we consider the educational level of athlete directors in Column 5. We do not find a significant 
coefficient on Athlete_education, suggesting that the educational level of an athlete director 
does not significantly alter his/her impact on firm value.  
4.5 Athlete directors and firm policies 
 Since our results suggest that athletic experience could enhance the monitoring role of 
board directors and improve firm performance, we further explore the channel through which 
firm value is increased. Specifically, we focus on two factors which are correlated with 
corporate decisions, firm investment and financial leverage, and test the effect of the athlete 
board directors on them. Firm investment is measured by the total capital expenditure scaled 
by total assets. Financial leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The results are reported 
in Table 7. 
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 The results in Column 1 and 2 show that firms with athlete directors are more likely to 
decrease their investment, based on both measures of the presence and the relative proportion 
of athlete directors. The coefficients are significant at the 10% level. These results imply that 
athlete directors are effective in monitoring the management team to reduce the firm risk 
caused by capital expenditure. In Column 3, the positive coefficient on Athlete indicates that 
firms with athlete directors are associated with 0.9% higher financial leverage. While the 
magnitude is low, the sign is in line with the view of debt financing as a governance mechanism. 
Aivazian et al. (2005) argue that higher leverage pre-commits managers to pay cash as interest 
and principal, and restricts managers from investing in value-destructive projects. Overall, 
athletes may help overcome the overinvestment problem.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Despite the growing interest of finance researchers in the attributes and expertise-
related backgrounds of board directors that help explain board director heterogeneity (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 2001; Jiang and Murphy, 2007; Güner et al., 2008; White et al., 2014; Litov et 
al., 2014; Francis et al., 2015), the literature has remained relatively limited when it comes to 
non-expertise-related experience. In this study, we focus on a particular type of non-expertise-
related experience, athletic experience, as the personal traits and attributes of athletes are highly 
relevant to the key factors known to affect the effectiveness of boards. In addition, athletic 
experience has yet to be examined in the board literature. 
Using a large global panel of 94,496 firm-year observations from 14,328 firms in 71 
countries over the period from 1999 to 2015, we provide evidence that the presence of athlete 
directors and the relative proportion of athlete directors matter to firm performance. We find a 
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significant and positive association between athletic experience and firm performance. The 
findings are consistent with our prediction that personal characteristics (i.e. physical fitness 
and personality/psychological traits) associated with athletes benefit boards and enhance firm 
value, and suggest that such non-expertise-related personal experience has real economic 
consequences for corporate governance and firm performance. In addition, this positive relation 
is more pronounced during times of distress, which suggests that athlete directors perform 
better in such times. Furthermore, our additional analysis indicates that athlete directors who 
participated in team sports and confrontational sports improve firm performance more 
significantly than those who were involved in individual sports and non-confrontational sports. 
Finally, we employ the PSM and 2SLS approaches to address potential endogeneity problems. 
The results are consistent with our baseline findings.  
  Our study has important implications for corporate governance practice. Besides the 
board structure (e.g. proportion of outside directors) and directors’ expertise-related 
backgrounds, non-expertise-related experiences (e.g. athletic experiences) also matter for 
board performance. Our findings are also important for both shareholders and participants in 
the managerial labour market, including board directors, senior executives, and executive 
selection panels. We highlight the importance of certain personal traits (e.g. physical fitness 
and mental resilience) and skills associated with early-life experiences for job performance.   
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Figure 1. 
 
This  figure shows the percentage of firms with athlete directors around the world.
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Table 1 Sample Description 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides the summary statistics for the sample between 1999 and 2015. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variable Section A  Section B  Section C  Section D 
 Full sample (F)  Board with Athlete Directors (T)  Board without Athlete Directors (N)  
Difference in 
Means (T-N)  
 Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max   Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max  Mean 
Tobin's Q 94,496 1.80 1.46 0.49 10.41  2,965 1.79 1.29 0.49 10.41  91,531 1.80 1.47 0.49 10.41  -0.01 
ROA 93,439 0.02 0.18 -0.99 0.36  2,947 0.05 0.10 -0.99 0.36  90,490 0.016 0.17 -0.99 0.36  0.035*** 
Athlete 94,496 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00  2,965 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00  91,531 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  N/A 
Athlete ratio 94,496 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.43  2,965 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.43  91,531 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  N/A 
Academic  94,496 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.86  2,965 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.57  91,531 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.86  -0.03*** 
Financial expertise 94,496 0.20 0.15 0.00 1  2,965 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.75  91,531 0.20 0.15 0.00 1.00  0.01*** 
Legal expertise 94,496 0.08 0.11 0.00 1  2,965 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.75  91,531 0.08 0.11 0.00 1.00  -0.03*** 
Education 94,496 1.28 0.53 0.00 3  2,965 1.44 0.42 0 3.00  91,531 1.27 0.53 0.00 3.00  -0.17*** 
Board size 94,496 8.68 3.27 3.00 20.00  2,965 10.36 3.15 3.00 20.00  91,531 8.63 3.26 3.00 20.00  1.73*** 
Male 94,496 0.91 0.10 0.57 1.00  2,965 0.89 0.10 0.57 1.00  91,531 0.91 0.10 0.57 1.00  -0.03*** 
Foreign 94,496 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.70  2,965 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.70  91,531 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.70  -0.02*** 
Independence 94,496 0.76 0.17 0.20 1.00  2,965 0.82 0.11 0.38 1.00  91,531 0.75 0.17 0.20 1.00  0.06*** 
Firm size 94,496 20.51 2.24 14.96 26.07  2,965 21.93 2.02 14.96 26.07  91,531 20.46 2.23 14.96 26.07  1.47*** 
Sales growth 94,496 0.20 0.72 -0.93 5.56  2,965 0.13 0.48 -0.93 5.56  91,531 0.20 0.73 -0.93 5.56  -0.07*** 
Leverage 94,496 0.53 0.27 0.01 1.32  2,965 0.59 0.24 0.01 1.32  91,531 0.53 0.27 0.01 1.32  0.06*** 
Cashflow 94,496 0.10 0.24 -0.70 0.49  2,965 0.15 0.17 -0.70 0.49  91,531 0.09 0.25 -0.70 0.49  0.06*** 
Rule of law  93,854 5.03 1.31 1 6  2,956 5.49 1.12 1 6  90,898 5.01 1.31 1 6  -0.472*** 
Corruption  93,854 3.77 1.47 0.5 6  2,956 4.53 1.25 1 6  90,898 3.74 1.47 1 6  -0.778*** 
Team-sports        2,965 0.41 0.48 0 1         
Confront sports       2,965 0.43 0.49 0 1         
Achievement        2,965 0.05 0.22 0 1         
Executive athlete       2,965 0.14 0.34 0 1         
Athlete_education        2,965 1.48 0.87 0 3         
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Country 
 
 
This table shows the distribution of firms and observations across countries. 
 
 
 
 
Country Firms Observations 
Athlete 
firms 
Country Firms Observations 
Athlete 
firms 
Argentina 9 65 0 Malaysia 175 572 5 
Australia 685 3,548 184 Mexico 35 150 12 
Austria 52 326 0 Morocco 3 24 0 
Barbados 1 8 0 Netherlands 159 1,045 0 
Belgium 101 824 0 New Zealand 41 146 2 
Bermuda 62 373 11 Nigeria 30 96 2 
Brazil 82 326 2 Norway 132 1,063 3 
British Virgin Islands 7 31 0 Oman 2 6 0 
Canada 638 3,177 84 Pakistan 4 10 0 
Cayman Islands 15 71 0 Panama 2 15 0 
Chile 20 91 0 Peru 7 26 0 
China 223 903 19 Philippines 32 122 4 
Colombia 12 37 0 Poland 26 145 4 
Croatia 2 15 0 Portugal 34 273 0 
Cyprus 9 23 0 Qatar 5 12 0 
Czech Republic 4 25 0 Romania 1 8 0 
Denmark 48 330 8 Russia 65 263 11 
Egypt 8 36 0 Saudi Arabia 19 36 0 
Finland 64 392 0 Singapore 228 916 20 
France 410 3,329 31 Vietnam 4 17 0 
Germany 356 2,404 15 Slovenia 1 8 0 
Greece 55 345 2 South Africa 194 938 10 
Hong Kong 294 1,163 21 Spain 117 851 9 
Hungary 8 23 0 Sweden 180 1,464 15 
Iceland 11 33 0 Switzerland 129 1,081 23 
India 411 1,985 16 Taiwan 52 207 0 
Indonesia 47 134 0 Thailand 22 69 0 
Ireland 84 541 9 United Arab Emirates 37 110 6 
Israel 108 710 1 Turkey 32 107 8 
Italy 173 1,122 37 United Kingdom 2,204 15,127 55 
Japan 260 898 1 Guernsey 20 102 0 
Kenya 5 29 0 Jersey 9 36 0 
South Korea 34 91 1 Isle of Man 7 23 0 
Kuwait 2 6 0 Tanzania 1 9 0 
Lebanon 2 6 0 United States 5983 45,831 2,335 
Luxembourg 35 168 0     
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Panel C: Sample Distribution by Industry  
Industry Name  
Total 
obs. 
Athlete 
obs. 
Athlete 
/Total Industry Name  
Total 
obs. 
Athlete 
obs. 
Athlete 
/Total 
Agricultural Production - Crops 338 8 2.37% Transportation by Air 760 18 2.37% 
Agricultural Production - 
Livestock and Animal Specialties 77 3 3.90% Transportation Services 383 19 4.96% 
Metal Mining 1,990 25 1.26% Communications 2,938 75 2.55% 
Coal Mining 439 11 2.51% Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 3,212 161 5.01% 
Oil and Gas Extraction 3,420 116 3.39% Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 1517 33 2.18% 
Construction - General 
Contractors & Operative Builders 1,442 35 2.43% Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 1,084 54 4.98% 
Heamy Construction, Except 
Building Construction, Contractor 763 11 1.44% 
Building Materials, Hardware, Garden 
Supplies & Mobile Homes 223 10 4.48% 
Food and Kindred Products 2,355 124 5.27% General Merchandise Stores 557 53 9.52% 
Tobacco Products 164 9 5.49% Food Stores 692 2 0.29% 
Textile Mill Products 202 11 5.45% 
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline 
Service Stations 324 6 1.85% 
Apparel, Finished Products from 
Fabrics & Similar Materials 479 20 4.18% Apparel and Accessory Stores 891 57 6.40% 
Lumber and Wood Products, 
Except Furniture 325 27 8.31% 
Home Furniture, Furnishings and 
Equipment Stores 427 1 0.23% 
Furniture and Fixtures 304 17 5.59% Eating and Drinking Places 845 76 8.99% 
Paper and Allied Products 813 25 3.08% Miscellaneous Retail 1,043 50 4.79% 
Printing, Publishing and Allied 
Industries 1,099 72 6.55% Depository Institutions 6718 200 2.98% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 5,755 105 1.82% Nondepository Credit Institutions 817 16 1.96% 
Petroleum Refining and Related 
Industries 619 32 5.17% 
Security & Commodity Brokers, 
Dealers, Exchanges & Services 2,418 52 2.15% 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products 659 25 3.79% Insurance Carriers 2,628 105 4.00% 
Leather and Leather Products 166 8 4.82% Real Estate 2,490 60 2.41% 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete 
Products 750 14 1.87% Holding and Other Investment Offices 4,787 113 2.36% 
Primary Metal Industries 1,278 59 4.62% 
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and 
Other Lodging Places 693 72 10.39% 
Fabricated Metal Products 1,011 10 0.99% Personal Services 243 10 4.12% 
Industrial and Commercial 
Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 3,655 114 3.12% Business Services 9,829 238 2.42% 
Electronic & Other Electrical 
Equipment & Components 5,639 57 1.01% Motion Pictures 449 32 7.13% 
Transportation Equipment 2,050 95 4.63% Amusement and Recreation Services 679 96 14.14% 
Measuring, Photographic, 
Medical, & Optical Goods, & 
Clocks 3,986 129 3.24% 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, and 
Management Services 2876 52 1.81% 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Industries 583 30 5.15% Educational Services 345 16 4.64% 
Railroad Transportation 180 19 10.56% Social Services 129 10 7.75% 
Motor Freight Transportation 639 3 0.47% Health Services 1,079 44 4.08% 
Water Transportation 840 20 2.38%     
 
The table only reports the distribution of observations across industries which have athlete directors. The industries are classified by 
two-digit SIC code. Total obs. is the total number of observations in the full sample and athlete obs. is the number of observations of 
firms with athlete directors. 
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Table 2 Athlete Directors and Firm Value  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Athlete 0.095*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.024***     
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.006)     
Athlete ratio     0.657** 0.555** 0.553** 0.200*** 
     (0.240) (0.246) (0.248) (0.059) 
Academic   0.397*** 0.403*** 0.138***  0.398*** 0.403*** 0.138*** 
  (0.102) (0.104) (0.0302)  (0.102) (0.104) (0.030) 
Financial expertise  -0.006 -0.010 -0.00195  -0.005 -0.00994 -0.002 
  (0.0977) (0.101) (0.0205)  (0.098) (0.102) (0.020) 
Legal expertise  -0.148** -0.150** -0.043**  -0.148** -0.150** -0.042** 
  (0.058) (0.061) (0.020)  (0.058) (0.0615) (0.020) 
Education   0.271*** 0.271*** 0.0723***  0.271*** 0.271*** 0.072*** 
  (0.033) (0.034) (0.012)  (0.033) (0.0337) (0.012) 
Board size  0.0261*** 0.026*** 0.0125***  0.026*** 0.0262*** 0.013*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.00919) (0.002) 
Independence  -0.212 -0.226* 0.034  -0.212 -0.226* 0.0345 
  (0.137) (0.134) (0.039)  (0.137) (0.134) (0.039) 
Male   -0.601*** -0.605*** -0.217***  -0.602*** -0.606*** -0.217*** 
  (0.115) (0.112) (0.033)  (0.115) (0.113) (0.033) 
Foreign   0.318*** 0.324*** 0.107***  0.318*** 0.324*** 0.107*** 
  (0.051) (0.048) (0.026)  (0.052) (0.0487) (0.026) 
Firm size  -0.128*** -0.182*** -0.183*** -0.072*** -0.127*** -0.182*** -0.183*** -0.071*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.0159) (0.004) 
Sales growth 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.004 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.0036 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.006) (0.047) (0.046) (0.0475) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.094 0.139 0.135 0.248*** 0.094 0.140 0.135 0.248*** 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.182) (0.067) (0.177) (0.178) (0.181) (0.067) 
Cashflow -0.075 0.0381 0.0422 0.033 -0.076 0.038 0.0421 0.033 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.131) (0.041) (0.132) (0.130) (0.131) (0.041) 
Law   -0.0270 -0.001   -0.0272 -0.001 
   (0.031) (0.011)   (0.031) (0.011) 
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This table presents the OLS regression results for the relation between athlete directors and firm value. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is defined as 
the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Athlete is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one athlete director and zero 
otherwise. Athlete ratio is the ratio of athlete directors to board size. Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board. Academic, Financial expertise, Legal 
expertise, Independence, Male, and Foreign are the percentages of directors with academic experience, financial expertise, and legal expertise, and non-executive, 
male, and foreign directors on the board, respectively. Education is the average educational level of the directors. Firm size is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. 
Sales growth is the annual growth rate in sales. Leverage is the book value of debt over total assets. Cashflow is the ratio of funds from operations to net sales. Law 
is the law and order index, obtained from the International Country Risk Guide Table 3B. Corruption is the corruption index, obtained from the International 
Country Risk Guide Table 3B. All regressions include industry, country and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard 
errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Corruption    0.0286 0.006   0.0286 0.0066 
   (0.024) (0.015)   (0.0241) (0.014) 
Tobinq_lag1    0.681***    0.728*** 
    (0.105)    (0.112) 
Constant 4.04*** 5.25*** 5.269*** 1.736*** 4.029*** 5.253*** 5.270*** 1.736*** 
 (0.156) (0.176) (0.238) (0.142) (0.158) (0.176) (0.238) (0.142) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country cluster No Yes Yes Yes   No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 94,496 94,496 93,854 91,001 94,496 94,496 93,854 91,001 
R-squared 0.192 0.205 0.206 0.653 0.192 0.205 0.206 0.653 
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Table 3 Athlete Directors and Firm Performance during the Recent Global Financial 
Crisis 
Variable (1) 
Tobin’s Q 
(3) 
ROA 
(2) 
Stock 
return 
(3) 
Tobin’s Q 
(6) 
ROA 
(54) 
Stock 
return 
Athlete 0.126*** 0.010*** -0.503***    
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.134)    
Athlete ratio    0.911*** 0.006 -4.071 *** 
    (0.091) (0.033) (1.33) 
Crisis -0.356*** -0.038*** -0.089 -0.345*** -0.038*** -0.087 
 (0.047) (0.003) (0.077) (0.049) (0.003) (0.076) 
Athlete×Crisis 0.062** 0.005 0.333**    
 (0.027) (0.004) (0.134)    
Athlete ratio ×Crisis    0.490* 0.009** 2.358*** 
    (0.272) (0.004) (1.029) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 36,536 36,341 35,246 36,536 36,341 35,246 
R-squared 0.207 0.278 0.072 0.207 0.278 0.072 
 
This table presents the athlete regression results for the relation between athlete directors and firm value 
during the financial crisis. The estimations are based on a sample of all OECD countries over the period 
2004-2009. The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, the return on assets (ROA) and the stock return, 
respectively. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to the book value of assets. Stock return is defined as the annual buy-
and-hold returns. Crisis is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the financial crisis period (2007-
2009), and zero otherwise. Athlete is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one 
athlete director and zero otherwise. Athlete ratio is the ratio of athlete directors to board size. The control 
variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses 
and are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 Athlete Directors and Firm Performance (PSM Results) 
Variable (1) 
Tobin’s Q 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
Tobin’s Q 
(4) 
ROA 
Athlete 0.066*** 0.044**   
 (0.019) (0.002)   
Athlete ratio   0.627*** 0.031* 
   (0.190) (0.018) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,930 5,884 5,930 5884 
R-squared 0.224 0.299 0.224 0.299 
 
This table presents robustness tests on the association between athlete directors and firm performance. 
We select a matching sample from firms without athlete directors. We use nearest-neighbour propensity 
score matching based on country, year, industry, Academic, Financial expertise, Legal expertise, 
Education, Independence, Male, Foreign, Board size, Firm size, and all other board and firm-level 
variables that are included in Table 2. The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and the return on assets 
(ROA), respectively. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value 
of assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to the book value of assets. Athlete is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if a firm has at least one athlete director and zero otherwise. Athlete ratio is the ratio of 
athlete directors to board size. The control variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions include 
industry, country, and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust 
standard errors are given in parentheses and are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5 Athlete Directors and Firm Value (2SLS Results) 
 
Panel A: First-stage Results - Prediction of Athlete and Athlete ratio 
Variable Athlete Athlete ratio 
Olympic medals 0.017*** 0.002*** 
 (0.004) (0.0005) 
Olympic sports 0.077*** 0.009*** 
 (0.020) (0.002) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 93,320 93,320 
R-squared 0.050 0.041 
   
Panel B: Second-stage Results - Athlete Directors and Firm Value 
Variable Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
Athlete^ 2.038**  
 (0.948)  
Athlete ratio^  15.391** 
  (7.386) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 93,320 93,320 
R-squared 0.152 0.164 
   
Durbin–Wu–Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
 Athlete Athlete ratio 
Test Statistic 
 (p-value) 
4.603** 
(0.031) 
4.213** 
(0.040) 
 
This table presents the results of regressions to predict Athlete and Athlete ratio, respectively. In the 
first stage, the dependent variable is Athlete or Athlete ratio. Athlete is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if a firm has at least one athlete director and zero otherwise. Athlete ratio is the ratio of athlete 
directors to board size. In the second stage, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q, which is defined 
as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Athlete^ is the predicted 
probability that a firm has at least one athlete director, taken from the first-stage regression. Athletic 
ratio^ is the predicted ratio of athlete directors to board size, taken from the first-stage regression. 
Controls are the control variables, which are the same as those in Table 2. We perform a Durbin–Wu–
Hausman test for endogeneity and the chi-squared and p-value are provided. All regressions include 
industry, country, and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust 
standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 The Backgrounds of the Athlete Directors and Firm Value  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Team-sport 0.107**     
 (0.040)     
Confrontational sport  0.142***    
  (0.029)    
Achievement    -0.075   
   (0.181)   
Executive athlete    0.076  
    (0.048)  
Athlete_education      0.029 
     (0.033) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,965 2,965 2,965 2,965 2,956 
R-squared 0.279 0.280 0.278 0.278 0.282 
 
This table presents additional tests on the association between athlete directors and firm value. We 
select a matching sample from the firms without athlete directors. We use a nearest-neighbour 
propensity score matching based on country, year, industry, Academic, Financial expertise, Legal 
expertise, Education, Independence, Male, Foreign, Board size, Firm size, and all other board and firm-
level variables that are included in Table 2. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined 
as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Team-sport is defined as the ratio 
of team-sport athlete directors to all athlete directors on the board. Confrontational sports is defined as 
the ratio of athlete directors who competed in confrontational sports to all athlete directors on the board. 
Achievement is defined as the ratio of athlete directors who won a medal at the Olympics to all athlete 
directors on the board. Executive athlete is defined as the ratio of executive athletes to all athlete 
directors on the board. Athlete_education is defined as the average educational level of the athlete 
directors. The control variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions include industry, country, 
and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are 
given in parentheses and are clustered by country. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 7 Athlete Directors and Firm Policy 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the relation between athlete directors and firms’ 
investment and leverage. The dependent variable is either the ratio of total investment to total assets or the 
leverage ratio. Athlete is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one athlete director and 
zero otherwise. Athlete ratio is the ratio of athlete directors to board size. Board size is the number of 
directors sitting on the board. Academic, Financial expertise, Legal expertise, Independence, Male, and 
Foreign are the percentages of directors with academic experience, financial expertise, and legal expertise, 
and non-executive, male, and foreign directors on the board, respectively.  Education is the average 
educational level of the directors. Firm size is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Sales growth is the 
annual growth rate in sales. Leverage is the book value of debt over total assets. Cashflow is the ratio of 
funds from operations to net sales. Law is the law and order index, obtained from the International Country 
Risk Guide Table 3B. Corruption is the corruption index, obtained from the International Country Risk 
Guide Table 3B. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Investment (1) Investment (2) Leverage (1) Leverage (2) 
Athlete -0.222*  0.009**  
 (0.128)  (0.004)  
Athlete ratio  -1.854*  0.030 
  (1.018)  (0.025) 
Academic  -0.587** -0.588** -0.074*** -0.073*** 
 (0.254) (0.253) (0.027) (0.027) 
Financial expertise -0.184 -0.185 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.408) (0.410) (0.009) (0.009) 
Legal expertise 0.309 0.307 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (0.266) (0.266) (0.016) (0.016) 
Education  0.283*** 0.283*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.005) (0.005) 
Board size -0.022 -0.023 0.002 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) 
Independence -3.330*** -3.330*** -0.061 -0.061 
 (0.551) (0.551) (0.073) (0.073) 
Male  1.620*** 1.623*** -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.346) (0.344) (0.019) (0.019) 
Foreign  -0.288 -0.288 -0.023** -0.023** 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm size  -0.068** -0.068** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002) 
Sales growth 1.555*** 1.555*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.003) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.612** 0.611**   
 (0.301) (0.301)   
Cashflow 3.403*** 3.404*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 
 (0.622) (0.622) (0.034) (0.034) 
Law 0.128 0.129 0.022** 0.022** 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.008) (0.008) 
Corruption  -0.165 -0.165 -0.011* -0.011* 
 (0.023) (0.132) (0.006) (0.006) 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 87,383 87,382 93,854 93,854 
R-squared 0.282 0.282 0.347 0.347 
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Appendix A Variable definitions 
Variable 
 
Description 
 Dependent variables  
Tobin's Q Defined as the market value of assets over the book value of assets. The 
market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity.   
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets   
Stock return  Annual buy-and-hold returns 
Board governance variables  
Athlete A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that have at least one athlete 
director on the board, and zero otherwise 
Athlete ratio The proportion of athlete directors on the board  
Academic  The proportion of university professors on the board 
Financial expertise The proportion of directors with financial expertise on the board 
Legal expertise The proportion of directors with legal expertise on the board 
Education  The average educational level of the directors 
Board size  The total number of directors on the board  
Male The proportion of male directors on the board 
Foreign The proportion of foreign directors on the board 
Independence The proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
Education  The average educational level of the board members  
Team-sport The ratio of team-sport athlete directors to total athlete directors on the 
board 
Confrontational 
sports  
The ratio of athlete directors who competed in confrontational sports to all 
athlete directors on the board 
Achievement  The ratio of athlete directors who won a medal at the Olympics to all athlete 
directors on the board 
Executive athlete   The ratio of executive athletes to all athlete directors on the board 
Athlete_education  The average educational level of the athlete directors 
Other control variables 
Firm size  The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets 
Sales growth  The annual growth rate of total sales 
Leverage  The ratio of the book value of debt to total assets  
Cashflow The ratio of funds from operations to net sales. The funds from operations 
are the sum of net income and all non-cash charges and credits.   
Crisis A dummy variable that equals 1 for the years of the recent global financial 
crisis (2007-2009), and 0 otherwise 
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Rule of law The law and order index, obtained from the International Country Risk 
Guide Table 3B. The values for 2014 and 2015 are calculated as the average 
value over 2011-2013. Rule of law values range from 0 to 6. A higher value 
means a stronger rule of law. 
Corruption  The corruption index, obtained from the International Country Risk Guide 
Table 3B. The values for 2014 and 2015 are calculated as the average value 
over 2011-2013. Corruption values range from 0 to 6. A higher value means 
less corruption. 
Instrumental variables  
Olympic medals The total number of medals (including gold, silver, and bronze) a country 
won in the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, scaled by 100  
Olympic sports The total number of sports in which a country participated over both 
Summer and Winter Olympic Games, scaled by 100 
 
